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ABSTRACT
THE COAUTHORS’ PROBLEM REVISITED:
FROM NETWORKS TO COVERS
MERMER Ays.e Gu¨l
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
January 2010
In this thesis, we reexamine the Coauthors’ Problem, introduced by Jackson
and Wolinsky, 1996. We propose the Extended Coauthor Model using the
cover notion, allowing for multilateral links among authors. We study the
model under two utility functions, which are the extreme members of the class
of utility functions induced by diﬀerent synergy terms. We ﬁnd the structure
of the eﬃcient and the link-wise stable covers formed under diﬀerent utility
functions, which depend on the synergy term under consideration. Moreover
we introduce the core and core stability concepts for covers and investigate the
properties possessed by core-stable covers. We ﬁnd the relationship between
the allocation induced by core-stable covers and the allocations in core, under
player based ﬂexible allocation rule. Finally we investigate the endogenous
cover formation via a strategic form game, called the hyper-link formation
game. We deﬁne Nash stability and Strong Nash stability for covers and
study the characteristics of such covers.
Keywords: Coauthors’ Problem, Covers, Eﬃcieny, Stability, Core, Hyperlink
Formation Game.
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O¨ZET
ORTAK YAZAR MODELI˙NI˙N
GENELLES.TI˙RI˙LMESI˙ :
AG˜LARDAN O¨RTU¨LERE
MERMER Ays.e Gu¨l
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Ocak 2010
Bu tez c.alıs.mamızda, daha o¨nce Jackson ve Wolinsky, 1996, tarafından
o¨nerilmis. olan Ortak Yazar Modelinini yeniden inceliyoruz. O¨rtu¨ kavramı ile
c.oklu bag˜lara izin vererek Genelles.tirilmis. Ortak Yazar Modelini sunuyoruz.
Modeli sinerji ailesinin iki uc. u¨yesi olan farklı sinerji terimlerini kullandıg˜ımız
fayda fonksiyonları altında inceliyoruz. Verimli ve bag˜a go¨re kararlı olan
o¨rtu¨lerin yapılarının sinerji terimine bag˜lı olarak deg˜is.tig˜ini buluyoruz. Daha
sonra, o¨rtu¨ler ic.in c.ekirdek ve c.ekirdek kararlılık kavramlarını tanımlıyor ve
c.ekirdek kararlı yapıların o¨zelliklerini inceliyoruz. Oyuncu merkezli esnek
dag˜ıtım kuralı altında c.ekirdek ve c.ekirdek kararlılık kavramları arasındaki
ilis.kiyi buluyoruz. Son olarak, ic.sel o¨rtu¨ olus.umunu hiperkenar olus.turma
oyunu olarak adlandırdıg˜ımız stratejik oyun vasıtası ile inceliyoruz. O¨rtu¨ler
ic.in Nash kararlılık ve Gu¨c.lu¨ Nash kararlılık kavramlarını tanımlıyor ve bu
kararlılık yapısına sahip o¨rtu¨lerin o¨zelliklerini buluyoruz.
iv
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortak Yazar Problemi, O¨rtu¨, Verimlilik, Kararlılık, C. ekirdek,
Hiperkenar Olus.turma Oyunu.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Network Theory is one of the main tools which is used to model the relation-
ships between individuals in many economic and social frameworks. These re-
lationships play a critical role in a variety of contexts like information sharing,
trade agreements, treaties among nations and political unions. For example
the trade agreements among nations can be modelled using network struc-
ture by representing the countries as individuals and the trade agreements
as the links between them. One well-known example modelling the research
collaborations among authors is the ”Co-author Model”, due to Jackson and
Wolinsky, (1996). In this model authors are represented by the nodes in a
network, the collaboration between them is represented by the links in the
network. The utility of an author is formulated using the papers he is included
in and the papers that his co-authors are included in. In this framework, the
individual utilities of the authors correspond to the individual productivities
of the authors. Jackson and Wolinsky, (1996), examined the eﬃciency and
pair-wise stability of the networks formed under the proposed productivity,
or the utility, function.
One of the main assumptions in network theory is that relationships are
formed bilaterally, which are represented as a link between two agents. How-
ever relationships between agents are not necessarily bilateral always, namely
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as agreements among nations such as European Union or G-8, or the joint
work of people as co-authorships. In fact, the size of the coauthorships
changes depending on the area under study. The average number of coauthor-
ships in Mathematics and Economics is 2, in Physics 5, whereas in Medical
Sciences the number drastically increases to 50.
In this study, we use the cover structure, introduced by Koray, to model
these multilateral collaborations between co-authors. We propose several
utility functions to model the co-authorships in The Extended Co-author
Model. We examined mainly two synergy terms, two extreme members of the
whole synergy family, in deﬁning the utility function. The utility function of
an author depends on the number of papers he is included in, the number
of co-authors included in each paper, and the number of papers that his
co-authors included in. We investigate the eﬃciency and the stability of
the covers in this setting under diﬀerent productivity functions. We ask the
question that whether the eﬃcient and the stable cover structures are the ones
from whose restrictions to bilateral links one gets the eﬃcient and the stable
networks in The Co-author Model. We obtain diﬀerent results from those in
the Co-author Model. Jackson, (2002), showed the existence of a pairwise
stable network under the Myerson allocation rule and any value function. We
extend this result to covers, namely show the existence of link-wise stable
covers under Myerson allocation rule and any value function. Here the role of
Myerson allocation rule is crucial in the sense that the existence of link-wise
stable covers is not necessarily true under diﬀerent allocation rules.
We examine the core and the core-stability concepts for covers. We ex-
tended the Player Based Flexible Allocation Rule for networks, due to Jack-
son,(2003), to covers. The link-wise stability, which is the counterpart of
pairwise stability in networks, allows only one hyper-link addition or destruc-
tion in one step . We deﬁne the core of 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 and the value function for
the covers, which allows several hyper-link additions and destructions in one
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step, and show that the player based ﬂexible cover allocation rule belongs
to the core. Diﬀerently from the cooperative game theory results, we show
that the the allocation induced by the Myerson allocation rule, which is the
counterpart of the Shapley value, is not necessarily a member of the core
relative to a convex value function. We deﬁne the core-stability for covers
allowing for addition or destruction of several hyper-links in one step, which
is a more ﬂexible stability notion compared to the core concept, in the sense
that it allows the agents outside the coalition under consideration to form
hyper-links also. We show the equivalence of eﬃciency of a cover with re-
spect to any value function and the core stability of a cover with respect to
any value function under the player based ﬂexible cover allocation rule. We
show the relationship between the core-stability and core under the player
based ﬂexible cover allocation rule and any convex value function. Besides
taking the cover structures as given, we deﬁne the strategic link formation
game for covers, namely the hyper-link formation game, and examine the
covers induced by Strong Nash equilibrium of this game. We show that the
cover induced by Strong Nash Equilibrium of the hyper-link formation game
for any convex value function and the player based ﬂexible cover allocation
rule belongs to the core of 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 and the convex value function.
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CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
2.1 The Model
In many economic frameworks individuals form relationships from which they
beneﬁt. These relationships play a critical role in a variety of contexts like
information sharing, trade agreements, treaties among nations and political
unions. Network structure is a well known tool to model these relationships.
One of the main assumptions in network structure is that relationships are
formed bilaterally, which are represented as a link between two agents. How-
ever relationships between agents are not necessarily bilateral always, namely
as agreements among nations such as European Union or G-8, joint degree
programs among collages as exchange programs, joint work of people as co-
authorships and so on. We use the model, the cover structure, introduced
by Koray, to capture these relationships whose restriction to bilateral re-
lationships is a network structure. We call these multi-agent relationships
hyper-links, whose counterpart in network structure are links. Then, the
cover structure can be seen as a hyper-graph which consists of the vertices,
representing the agents, and the hyper-links, representing the relationships
between agents. We also make the assumption that, if a group of agents form
a hyper-link, then agents included in that group can not form another hyper-
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link among themselves. That is, if a group of nations are agreed to have a
trade alliance, then sub-groups are not allowed to make an alliance among
themselves. However, possible overlapping of agents in diﬀerent relationships
are allowed. That is a country in a trade alliance among the nations in Eu-
rope may also be in some other trade alliance in Asia. One possible scenario
to motivate our model is on trade agreements. Assume that there is good to
be traded among nations, which can be produced in every country identically
with the same cost and can be sold at the same price in each country. A
group of nations make an alliance if they want to trade this identical good
within the group. Say countries X, Y, and Z agree upon this alliance. Then
the good produced in country X can be traded to country Y and Z. Say coun-
try X also wants to make an alliance with the counties K and L, and K and
L agree, however Y and Z does not. Then the group X, K and L make a
new alliance among themselves. Being the alliance among the countries X,
Y, and Z present, Y and Z do not make a new alliance as the quality, cost
and price of the good is identical. Any country which is not in an alliance
can only produce and sell the good in his own borders. This is interpreted
as his only relation is the trivial one, namely with himself. Notice that the
union of all relationships gives the set of countries. A very similar scenario
can be considered for exchange program agreements among collages, with the
assumption that the cost and beneﬁt of having an exchange of students within
each collage is identical.
2.2 Deﬁnitions and Notations
Let 푁 be a ﬁnite non-empty set of agents that will be ﬁxed throughout the
paper. First we deﬁne the hyper-link concept :
Deﬁnition 1. Given the set of players 푁 , a hyper-link 퐸 is an element of
2푁 ∖ ∅.
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Now we deﬁne the cover structure formally as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. A subset 퐶 of 2푁 is said to be a cover for 푁 agents if
1.
∪
퐸∈퐶 퐸 = 푁 and
2. ∕ ∃퐸,퐸 ′ ∈ 퐶 : 퐸 ⊊ 퐸 ′.
We will denote the set of all covers for 푁 by 풞푁 .
Deﬁnition 3. Given a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , a member 퐸 ∈ 퐶 is said to be a
hyper-link of order 푡, written 표푟푑(퐸) = 푡 if ∣ 퐸 ∣= 푡+ 1 .
Note that a cover 퐶 is a collection of subsets 퐸 ∈ 2푁 , such that these
subsets are allowed to be overlapping but are not allowed to contain each other
and the union of these subsets cover the player set 푁 . If 퐸 = {푖1, 푖2, . . . , 푖푘} ∈
퐶 then we say that the players 푖1, 푖2, . . . , 푖푘 are linked in the cover 퐶. For the
easiness of notation, we will use (푖1푖2 . . . 푖푘, . . . , 푗1푗2 . . . 푗푙) to denote the cover
{{푖1푖2 . . . 푖푘}, . . . , {푗1푗2 . . . 푗푙}}. Note that the hyper-link notion in our model
diﬀers from the link notion in networks in the sense that players are allowed
to be related to more than one player. For any 푆 ⊂ 푁 , 퐶푆 denotes a subset
of 풞푁 such that the players in 푁 ∖푆 are only allowed to form the hyper-links
of order 0 and the remaining players in 푆 are allowed to form the hyper-links
of any order, at most with the highest order ∣푆∣ − 1.
Example 1. Let 푁 = {1, 2, . . . , 10} and 퐶 = (123, 23, 34, 5678, 89, 10) The
cover 퐶 has 6 hyper-links, with the orders 2, 1, 1, 3, 1, 0 respectively.
We deﬁne adding a hyper-link to a cover 퐶 or severing a hyper-link from
a cover 퐶 as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. Given any cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , severing a hyper-link from 퐶 or
adding a hyper-link to 퐶 is deﬁned as follows: Given any cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 ,
and any hyper-link 퐸 ∕∈ 퐶 such that there is no 퐸 ′ ∈ 퐶 with 퐸 ⊆ 퐸 ′,
퐶 + 퐸 denotes adding the hyper-link 퐸 ∕∈ 퐶 to the cover 퐶 and is deﬁned
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by: 퐶 + 퐸 = 퐶 ∖ {퐸 ′ ∈ 퐶 : 퐸 ′ ⊆ 퐸} ∪ {퐸}. Given any cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 and
any hyper-link 퐸 ∈ 퐶, 퐶 − 퐸 denotes severing the hyper-link 퐸 ∈ 퐶 and is
deﬁned by: 퐶 − 퐸 = 퐶 ∖ {퐸} ∪ {{푖} : 푖 ∈ 퐸 and ∄퐸 ′ ∈ 퐶 ∖ {퐸} with ∈ 퐸 ′}
Deﬁnition 5. A cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is said to be connected if for any 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 , there
exists a sequence 퐸1, 퐸2, . . . , 퐸푘 ∈ 퐶 of hyper-links such that 푖 ∈ 푆1,푗 ∈ 푆푘
and for any 푙 ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 푘 − 2 : 퐸푙 ∩ 퐸푙+1 ∕= ∅.
A cover is connected if one can follow a path 퐸1, . . . , 퐸푘 for a cover with k
hyper-links, in such a way that two hyper-links 퐸푖 and 퐸푖+1 has a nonempty
intersection.
Given a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , the set 푁(퐶) = {푖 ∈ 푁 : ∃퐸 ∈ 퐶 with ∣퐸∣ ∕= 0 :
푖 ∈ 퐸} denotes the agents which are included in at least one hyper-link 퐸
with an order greater then 0 in the cover 퐶, that is all the players except the
isolated ones.
Deﬁnition 6. Given a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , a subcover is deﬁned to ve a subset of
퐶 which possesses the properties of being a cover.
If a cover is not connected, then we say it has components, which are
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7. A nonempty sub-cover 푇 ⊂ 퐶 is said to be a component of
the cover 퐶 if:
1. For every 푖 and 푗 in푁(푇 ) with 푖 ∕= 푗: there exists a sequence 푆1, . . . , 푆푘 ∈
푇 of hyper-links with 푖 ∈ 푆1 and 푗 ∈ 푆푘 and for all 푡 ∈ 1, . . . , 푘 − 1 :
퐸푡 ∩ 퐸푡+1 ∕= ∅, that is any two players in 푇 are connected.
2. For every 푖 ∈ 푁(푇 ), for every 퐸 ∈ 퐶 with 푖 ∈ 퐸 one has 퐸 ∈ 푇 .
A connected component of a cover is the maximal sub-cover which is
connected. We will use 퐶푝(퐶) to denote the set of all connected components
of the cover 퐶.
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In example, 1, the cover 퐶 is not connected, since for the players 4
and 5, there is no sequence of hyper-links 퐸1, 퐸2, . . . , 퐸푘 ∈ 퐶 such that
4 ∈ 푆1, 5 ∈ 푆푘 with 푖 ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 푘 − 2 : 퐸푖 ∩ 퐸푖+1 ∕= ∅. The cover 퐶 has
3 components which are 퐶푝(퐶) = {(123, 23, 34), (5678, 89), (10)}. The set
푁(퐶) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} as 10 is isolated.
We now deﬁne a complete cover, which is quite diﬀerent from the concept
of a complete network.
Deﬁnition 8. A cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is said to be complete cover if: 퐶 = {(1 2
. . . 푛)}, that is if it is composed of only one hyper-link containing all of the
players.
Complete cover consists of the hyper-link which contains all of the players.
Note that, a cover consisting of the hyper-link with the highest possible order
can not contain any other hyper-link by deﬁnition. In the above example, 1,
the complete cover is 퐶 = {12345678910}. This deﬁnition of complete cover
is diﬀerent from the complete network in the sense that, any network for 푛
agents is a subset of the complete network, which is not true for complete
covers.
A value function gives the value generated by the players under diﬀerent
cover structures. Similar to the value functions of networks, a value function
is diﬀerent from a transferable utility game in the sense that players forming
diﬀerent covers in the same society can create diﬀerent values. So, the value
created by players depends on how the relations between players are formed.
We deﬁne a value function formally as follows.
Deﬁnition 9. A function 푣 : 풞푁 → ℝ is said to be a value function if
푣(퐸) = 0 whenever for every 퐸 ∈ 퐶 one has 표푟푑(퐸) = 0. Let 푉 denote the
set of all value functions.
We now deﬁne eﬃciency for covers.
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Deﬁnition 10. Given a value function 푣 for 풞푁 , a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is said to
be eﬃcient if 푣(퐶) = max퐶′∈풞푁 푣(퐶 ′).
We will denote max퐶′∈풞푁 푣(퐶 ′) by 푣ˆ(퐶푁). We will denote the set of all
eﬃcient covers by 풞푒.
Deﬁnition 11. A value function 푣 ∈ 푉 is said to be convex if for every 푖 ∈ 푁 ,
for every 푆, 푇 ∈ 2푁∖{푖} :푆 ⊂ 푇 ⇒ 푣ˆ(퐶푆∪푖)− 푣ˆ(퐶푆) ≤ 푣ˆ(퐶푇∪푖)− 푣ˆ(퐶푇 ).
We will denote the set of all convex value functions by 푉 푐. We now deﬁne
super-additivity for value functions.
Deﬁnition 12. A value function 푣 ∈ 푉 is said to be super additive if for all
푆, 푇 ∈ 2푁 ∖ {∅} : 푆 ∩ 푇 = ∅ ⇒ 푣ˆ(퐶푆∪푇 ) ≥ 푣ˆ(퐶푆) + 푣ˆ(퐶푇 ).
We will denote the set of all super additive value functions by 푉 푠푎.
An allocation rule determines how the total value of a given cover is dis-
tributed among the players. An allocation rule both depends on the value
function 푣 and how the players form their relations, namely the cover struc-
ture.
Deﬁnition 13. A function 푌 : 풞푁 × 푉 → ℝ푛 with ∑푛푖=1 푌푖(퐶, 푣) = 푣(퐶) is
called an allocation rule.
Since the formulations of allocation problem include the value function
directly, we will write 푌푖(퐶) instead of 푌푖(퐶, 푣).
Deﬁnition 14. Given a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , and a value function 푣 ∈ 푉 , the
Myerson allocation rule 푌 푀푉 for any player 푖 ∈ 푁 is deﬁned as follows:
푌 푀푉푖 (퐶) =
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푖}(푣(퐶∣푆∪{푖})− 푣(퐶∣푆))( ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!푛! )
where the restriction of a cover to a set 푣(퐶∣푆) is deﬁned as (퐶∣푆) = {퐸 ∩
푆 : 퐸 ∈ 퐶 with 퐸∩푆 ∕= ∅ and ∕ ∃퐸 ′ ∈ 퐶 : 퐸∩푆 ⊂ 퐸 ′∩푆}∪{{푖} : 푖 ∈ 푁 ∖푆}.
When we restrict a cover 퐶 to a subset 푆 ⊂ 푁 , we require the players
not in 푆 to be singletons, preserve the hyper-links that are subsets of 푆, and
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for the hyper-links that are not in 푆 but has a nonempty intersection with
푆, we keep the elements that are in 푆 as a new hyper-link in case there is no
other hyper-link in 퐶 containing it.
Example 2. Let 퐶 = (1234, 345, 235) and 푆 = {2, 3, 4}. Now (퐶∣푆) =
(234, 1, 5). Although the intersection of the hyper-link (345) with 푆 is nonempty,
it is not included in the restricted cover as {3, 4, 5} ∩ {2, 3, 4} = {3, 4} ⊂
{2, 3, 4} = {1, 2, 3, 4} ∩ {2, 3, 4} where (1234) ∈ 퐶.
Deﬁnition 15. Given any subset 풞¯ ⊆ 풞푁 and 푉¯ ⊆ 푉 , an allocation rule
푌 : 풞푁 × 푉 → ℝ푛 is said to be individually rational (IR) at (풞¯, 푉¯ ) if for all
∈ 풞¯ for all 푣 ∈ 푉¯ , ∀푖 ∈ 푁 : 푌푖(퐶, 푣) ≥ 푣ˆ(퐶{푖}).
We also deﬁne some stability notions in covers. The conditions required
for stability change relative to the stability concept under consideration, but
the underlying idea that players are allowed to severe or add hyper-links is the
same. In all stability notions, the main idea is that players can not become
better oﬀ by deviating from the present cover, that is either by adding or
severing a hyper-link. Before deﬁning the stability concepts we use, we ﬁrst
deﬁne some auxiliary concepts.
Deﬁnition 16. Two covers 퐶 and 퐶 ′ are said to be adjacent if they diﬀer
by a hyper-link, that is, either 퐶 ′ = 퐶 + 퐸 for some 퐸 /∈ 퐶 or 퐶 ′ = 퐶 − 퐸
for some 퐸 ∈ 퐶.
Two covers are adjacent if one can be obtained from the other by simply
adding or severing a hyper-link. Considering two adjacent covers, one blocks
the other one either by adding a hyper-link if all players in the new link
become better oﬀ while at least one them becomes strictly better oﬀ, or by
severing a hyper-link if there is a player in that link which becomes better of
after deletion of the hyper-link. We deﬁne this argument formally as follows.
Deﬁnition 17. Given a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , a value function 푣 ∈ 푉 , an allocation
rule 푌 , and a hyper-link 퐸 /∈ 퐶, 퐶+퐸 blocks 퐶 if: ∀푖 ∈ 퐸 : 푌푖(퐸+퐶) ≥ 푌푖(퐶)
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and ∃푗 ∈ 퐸 : 푌푖(퐸 + 퐶) > 푌푖(퐶). For a hyper-link 퐸 ∈ 퐶, 퐶 − 퐸 blocks 퐶
if: ∃푖 ∈ 퐸 : 푌푖(퐶 − 퐸) > 푌푖(퐶).
Deﬁnition 18. An improving path from a cover 퐶 to a cover 퐶 ′ is a sequence
of covers 퐶1, 퐶2, . . . , 퐶푘 with ∀푖 ∈ 1, . . . , 푘 − 1 : 퐶푖 and 퐶푖+1 are adjacent
covers such that 퐶푖+1 blocks 퐶푖.
Deﬁnition 19. A cycle is an improving path 퐶1, 퐶2, . . . , 퐶푘 with 퐶1 = 퐶푘.
Deﬁnition 20. Given a value function 푣 and an allocation rule 푌 , a cover
퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is said to be link-wise stable if there is no cover 퐶 ′ ∈ 풞푁 with
either 퐶 ′ = 퐶 − 퐸 or 퐸 ′ = 퐶 + 퐸 which blocks 퐶, that is: For every
퐸 ∈ 퐶 : ∀푖 ∈ 퐸 : 푌푖(퐶) ≥ 푌푖(퐶 − 퐸) ∀퐸 /∈ 퐶 : [∃푖 ∈ 퐸 : 푌푖(퐶 + 퐸) >
푌푖(퐶)]⇒ [∃푗 ∈ 퐸 : 푌푗(퐶 + 퐸) < 푌푗(퐶)].
The link-wise stability deﬁnition is a counter-part of the pairwise stability
deﬁnition in networks. Link-wise stability is stronger than the pairwise sta-
bility in the sense that it allows deviations by any coalition whereas pairwise
stability only allows deviations by at most two players at a time. Notice that
a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is link-wise stable if there is no improving path starting from
퐶. In order a new hyper-link to be formed, the mutual consent of all players
in that hyper-link is needed, whereas hyper-link to be severed requires only
unilateral consent of one player in that link. It is worth noting that, link-wise
stability notion explains the situation where agents are unable to become bet-
ter oﬀ by cooperation in myopic sense, that is in each step only one hyper-link
can be formed or destroyed. In order to explain the situation where agents
are unable to become better of by cooperation in far-sighted sense, that is
the formation or destruction of more than one hyper-link are allowed in each
step, we use the core-stability notion. Before deﬁning core-stability, we deﬁne
the necessary auxiliary concepts as follows.
Deﬁnition 21. A cover 퐶 ′ is said to beat a cover 퐶 if 퐶 and 퐶 ′ are adjacent
and if 퐶 ′ = 퐶 +퐸 then 퐶 +퐸 blocks 퐶, if 퐶 ′ = 퐶 −퐸 then 퐶 −퐸 blocks 퐶.
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Deﬁnition 22. Given a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , and 푇 ⊂ 푁 , a function 푓 : 퐶 →
2푁 ∖{∅} is called a T-function on 퐶 if ∀퐸 ∈ 퐶 : 푓(퐸) ⊂ 퐸 with 퐸 ∖푓(퐸) ⊂ 푇 .
A cover 퐶 ′ ∈ 풞푁 is said to be obtainable from 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 via 푇 if 퐶 ′ ⊂ {푓(퐸) :
퐸 ∈ 퐶} ∪ 2푇 for some T-function for C.
A cover 퐶 ′ being obtainable from 퐶 via some T-function where 푇 ⊂ 푁
means that, the players in the coalition T are allowed to form hyper-links
among themselves that are not contained in 퐶 or severe some hyper-links
included in 퐶 in which at least one player of T is a member.
Deﬁnition 23. Given a value function 푣 ∈ 푉 and an allocation rule 푌
associated with 푣, let 퐶,퐶 ′ ∈ 풞푁 and 푇 ⊂ 푁 . We say that 푇 can improve
upon 퐶 via 퐶 ′ relative to 푣 and 푌 if 퐶 ′ is obtainable from 퐶 via 푇 and
∀푖 ∈ 푇 : 푌푖(퐶 ′) ≥ 푌푖(퐶) and ∃푗 ∈ 푇 : 푌푗(퐶 ′) > 푌푗(퐶).
Deﬁnition 24. A cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is said to be core stable relative to 푣 and 푌
if there is no 푇 ⊂ 푁 such that 푇 can improve upon 퐶 via some 퐶 ′ ∈ 풞푁 .
Core stability, similar to link-wise stability, allows any coalition to de-
viate including the grand coalition. Diﬀerent from link-wise stability, these
deviations are allowed to lead several hyper-links to be formed or severed.
In this sense, core stability is a stronger concept. A coalition 푆 improving
upon the cover 퐶 via some cover 퐶 ′ can be viewed as 퐶 ′ blocking 퐶 by the
deviations in the coalition 푆. Examining the ”core” concept in a TU-game,
our core-stability deﬁnition here diﬀers from the core in the sense that, the
players outside 푆 are still contributing to the formation of the new cover
as the hyper-links contained by those players are preserved. We deﬁne the
”core” for a cover in order to prevent the players outside 푆 to contribute to
the formation of the cover.
Deﬁnition 25. Given a value function 푣 ∈ 푉 , and a cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , an
allocation 푦 ∈ ℝ푛 for 퐶, is said to be in the core relative to (푁, 푣) if
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1.
∑
푖∈{푁} 푦푖 ≤ 푣(퐶) and,
2. ∀푆 ⊆ 푁 : ∑푖∈푆 푦푖 ≥ 푣ˆ(퐶푆).
This deﬁnition of core prevents the players outside 푆 to contribute to the
formation of a cover. Notice that the cover under consideration should be
eﬃcient, for otherwise taking 푆 = 푁 ,
∑
푖∈푁 푦푖 ≥ 푣ˆ(퐶푁) and
∑
푖∈{푁} 푦푖 ≤ 푣(푐)
would lead to a contradiction. In other words, for any cover which is not
eﬃcient, grand coalition can cooperate to jointly severe or add the necessary
hyper-links in order to form the new cover 퐶 ′ which is eﬃcient.
Note that core characterizes the allocations for eﬃcient covers such that
no coalition 푆 ⊂ 푁 can deviate from the eﬃcient cover under consideration
to generate a higher value than the sum of the allocations of agent in 푆.
Whereas core stability notion characterizes the covers that can not be im-
proved upon via some coalition 푆, that is no coalition 푆 can deviate from
the cover structure under consideration to become better oﬀ where at least
one agent becomes strictly better oﬀ. Also note that, the ”deviations” in two
concepts are diﬀerent. In the core, the players outside the deviating coalition
are assumed to forming hyper-edges of order 0, whereas in the core stabil-
ity, the players outside the deviating coalition are assumed to preserve their
hyper-link structure.
Deﬁnition 26. Given a set 푉¯ ⊆ 푉 of value functions, an allocation rule 푌
is said to be core-consistent relative to 푉¯ , if for any 푣 ∈ 푉¯ there exists an
eﬃcient cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 such that for some 푣 ∈ 푉¯ , for 퐶 the core relative to
(푁, 푣) is nonempty. 1
An allocation rule 푌 being core-consistent relative to 푉¯ , for some 푉¯ ⊆ 푉 ,
means that for some eﬃcient cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , 푌 (퐶) belongs to the core for 퐶
relative to (푁, 푣) for every 푣 ∈ 푉¯ .
1the counterpart of the core-consistency in networks, deﬁned by Jackson
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
3.1 Link-wise Stability
We extend the Co-author Model introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky, (1996),
to our model. In our extension, authors are assumed not to be restricted to
having binary co-authorships. An author is allowed to work on several papers,
and allowed to work with more than one co-author for each paper. There is
also a synergy between co-authors depending on the time they devote for the
paper, which in turn depends on how many paper each author is involved
in. Each paper is symbolized by a hyper-link 퐸, and for the author 푖 the
co-authors are symbolized by the agents in that hyper-link, namely 푗 ∈ 퐸.
The number of papers an author is involved in, namely the hyper-links he is
involved, is denoted by 푛푖, and so the time he devotes for paper is denoted
by 1
푛푖
. The synergy term is then captured by 1
푛푖
∑
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
. The payoﬀ of the
individual 푖 is represented by 푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸[
1
푛푖
+
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+ 1
푛푖
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
]
whenever the player is involved at least one paper-work with a co-author,
푢푖 = 1 whenever the player is working on a paper by himself only. The payoﬀ
of an author depends on not only how many papers he is involved in, but also
the number of co-authors he works with.
Jackson and Wolinsky, (1996), showed that in the co-author model, if the
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number of individuals 푛 is even, then the eﬃcient network structure consists
of 푛
2
separate links. They also showed that, if a network is pairwise stable,
and the number of individuals 푛 ≥ 4, then it is ineﬃcient. The pairwise
stable network in the co-author model consists of the maximum number of
possible links, that is, for 푛 players, the pairwise stable network is of the form:
{12, 23, 34, 45, . . . , (푛− 1)푛}.
In our extended model, we show that for 푛 ≥ 4, the eﬃcient cover struc-
ture consists of only one hyper-link with order 푛 − 1, that is the hyper-link
containing all of the individuals, {1234 . . . 푛}. This can be interpreted as
when authors are allowed to have only binary co-authorships then the eﬃ-
cient structure is formed when no paper have common authors, whereas when
authors are allowed to have co-authorships of diﬀerent orders then the eﬃ-
cient structure is formed when all of the authors are common in one paper.
We also show that if a cover is link-wise stable, for 푛 ≥ 4, then it is eﬃcient.
That is in the co-author model pairwise stable networks lead to ineﬃciency,
whereas in our extended model, link-wise stability leads to eﬃciency. We
show this result as follows:
Proposition 1. In the extended co-author model, when 푛 ≥ 4 the only eﬃ-
cient cover is the complete cover. Moreover the unique link-wise stable cover
is the complete cover.
Proof.
Claim. For any 푖 ∈ 푁 and for any cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 ∖ {(1 2 . . . 푛)}: 푢푖(퐶) <
푢푖((1 2 . . . 푛)).
Proof will be done by induction on n.
Let 푁 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, that is 푛 = 4. Then the payoﬀs of the all possible
covers are listed as follows:
푢(1, 2, 3, 4) = (1, 1, 1, 1) 푢(12, 3, 4) = (3, 3, 1, 1) 푢(12, 34) = (3, 3, 3, 3)
푢(12, 23, 4) = (2, 4, 2, 1) 푢(12, 13, 14) = (5, 5
3
, 5
3
, 5
3
)
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푢(12, 23, 34) = (2, 3 + 1
4
, 3 + 1
4
, 2) 푢(12, 13, 14, 23) = (3 + 2
3
, 2 + 1
4
, 2 + 1
4
, 1 + 2
3
)
푢(12, 13, 14, 24) = (2 + 7
9
, 2 + 7
9
, 2, 2)
푢(12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 34) = (2 + 1
3
, 2 + 1
3
, 2 + 1
3
, 2 + 1
3
))
푢(12, 234) = (2, 5 + 1
2
, 4, 2), 푢(123, 4) = (5, 5, 5, 1)
푢(123, 124) = (4 + 1
2
, 4 + 1
2
, 3, 3) 푢(123, 234) = (2, 2 + 3
4
, 2 + 3
4
, 2)
푢(123, 234, 341) = (3 + 1
2
, 3 + 1
2
, 4 + 1
2
, 3 + 1
2
) 푢(1234) = (7, 7, 7, 7).
All the remaining covers that are not listed here are of the same shape with
one of the listed one, and its value can easily be seen by the symmetric
structure of the co-author model.
Here, the unique eﬃcient cover is (1234) which is also the unique cover
which is link-wise stable. To see this, in the complete cover each player gets a
strictly higher payoﬀ than the remaining covers, so all of the players can come
together and form the hyper-link (1234) so that no other cover is link-wise
stable, and the only cover that can be obtained from the complete cover is
by severing the link, as there are no links to be added, and forming the new
structure (1, 2, 3, 4), in which each player gets the payoﬀ 1.
Induction hypothesis: Let the ﬁnite set of agents be 퐾 with ∣퐾∣ = 푘. For
any 푖 ∈ 퐾 and for any cover 퐶 ∈ (풞퐾 ∖ {(1 2 . . . 푘)}): 푢푖(퐶) < 푢푖(1 2 . . . 푘).
Now we show that our claim is true for 푛 = 푘 + 1.
Consider the situation where there are 푘 agents and an outsider agent
comes and joins to the society, so that we have 푘 + 1 agents. First let us
compute the contribution of (푘 + 1)-th agent to others in the complete cover
structure: For any 푖 ∈ 퐾: 푢푖({1, . . . , 푘 + 1}) − 푢푖({1, . . . , 푘}) = 1 + (푘) +
1(푘)− 1 + (푘 − 1) + 1(푘 − 1) = 2
Let 퐶 ′ be a cover diﬀerent from the complete cover for 푘 agents. Then
there are at least two hyper-links in 퐶 ′. Assume that there are more than 2
hyper-links with possibly diﬀerent orders. Let 푗 ∈ 푁 ∖ {푘 + 1}. Now let us
compute the utility of 푗-th agent in this cover arbitrary cover 퐶 ′. Then let
us compute possible highest increase in his utility when 푘 + 1 joined.
16
Assume that 푗 has 푚 hyper-links with orders 푑1, 푑2, . . ., 푑푚. Now 푢푗(퐶
′) =∑
퐸∈{퐸1,...,퐸푚}[
1
푛푗
+ (1 + 1
푛푗
)(
∑
푖∈(퐸∖{푗})
1
푛푖
)]. If each 푖 ∈ 퐸 ∖ {푗} is included in
hyper-links in which 푗 is not included, the utility will decrease. Let us consider
the possible highest value, so assume that each 푖 is included in hyper-links
that contain 푗. Then we get: 푢푗 = [1+(1+
1
푚
)(푑1−1)]+[1+(1+ 1푚)(푑2−1)+
[1 + (1 + 1
푚
)(푑푚− 1)]] where for some 푖,we obtain 1 when we sum 1푛푖 s over all
hyper-edges that 푖 is in, that is over all hyper-edges that 푗 is in by the above
assumption we made. So we have 푢푗 = 1 + (1 +
1
푚
)((푑1− 1) + (푑2− 1) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+
(푑푚− 1)) = 1 + (1 + 1푚)(푑1 + 푑2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푑푚−푚).The possible maximum value
that the sum (푑1 + 푑2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푑푚) can get is 푘− 1, as we have 푘 agents. Thus
푢푗 = 푘 −푚− 1 + 푘푚 − 1푚 .
Now let us compute the maximum possible utility of 푗 when (푘 + 1)-th
agent joining to several hyper-links. If 푘+ 1-th agent joins to the hyper-links
without 푗, then there will be no change. So assume that 푘+1-th agent joins at
least one link that 푗 is in. If he also joins hyper-links that 푗 is not in, then due
to the 1
푛푘+1
the utility of 푗 will increase less compared to the case where he only
joins to the links with 푗. But since we are trying to ﬁnd maximum utility, we
assume that he only joins to the hyper-links with 푗. Without loss of generality
assume that he joins all the hyper-links that 푗 is in. Denote this cover by
퐶 ′′. Then we have 푢푗(퐶 ′′) =
∑
퐸∈{퐸1,...,퐸푚}[
1
푛푗
+ (1 + 1
푛푗
)(
∑
푖∈(퐸∖{푗})
1
푛푖
)] =
1+(1+ 1
푚
)((푑1−1+ 1푚)+(푑2−1+ 1푚)+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+(푑푚−1+ 1푚)) = 1+(1+ 1푚)(푑1+
푑2+⋅ ⋅ ⋅+푑푚−푚+1). The possible highest value of the sum 푑1+푑2+. . .+푑푚 is
the total number of agents minus except 푗 and 푘+1, that is (푘+1)−2 = 푘−1.
So 푢푗 = 1+(1+
1
푚
)(푑1+푑2+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+푑푚−푚+1) = 1+(1+ 1푚)(푘−1−푚+1) =
푘−푚+ 푘
푚
. The maximum possible marginal contribution of 푘+1 to 푗 is then:
[푘 −푚+ 푘
푚
]− [푘 +푚− 1 + 푘
푚
− 1
푚
] = 1 + 1
푚
< 2 since 푚 ∕= 1. By induction
hypothesis 푢푗(퐶
′) < 푢푗(1 2 . . . 푘), so that 푢푗(퐶 ′′) = 푢푗(퐶 ′) +1 + 1푚 < 2 +푢푗(1
2 . . . 푘) = 푢푗(1 2 . . . 푘 푘 + 1) implying our claim for 푘 + 1.
Now it remains the check the above arguments for 푘 + 1-th agent. In the
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complete cover for 푘 + 1 agents each agent gets 2푘 + 1. Let 퐶 ′ be any cover
except then the complete one, for 푘+1 agents. Assume that 퐶 ′ has 푚 hyper-
links with orders 푑1, 푑2,. . .,푑푚. Assume that 푘 + 1-th agent joins all of the
hyper-links. Then his utility will be: 푢푘+1(퐶
′) =
∑
퐸∈{퐸1,...,퐸푚}[
1
푛푘+1
+ (1 +
1
푛푘+1
)(
∑
푖∈(퐸∖{푘+1})
1
푛푖
)] = 1 + (1 + 1
푚
)
∑
퐸∈{퐸1,...,퐸푚}[
∑
푖∈(퐸∖{푘+1})(
1
푛푖
)], where
the sum
∑
퐸∈{퐸1,...,퐸푚}[
∑
푖∈(퐸∖{푘+1})
1
푛푖
] can be at most k. As (1 + 1
푚
) < 2, we
have 푢푘+1(퐶
′) = 1 + (1 + 1
푚
)푘 < 2푘+ 1 = 푢푘+1(1 2 . . . (푘+ 1)), implying that
the utility of the (푘+ 1)-th agent is also strictly better in the complete cover
for each 푛 ≥ 4. Thus we have shown that any agent has strictly better payoﬀ
when the cover structure is complete. Thus we have proved the claim. Now
since each agents gets strictly better in the complete cover, it is the unique
eﬃcient. Moreover, as each agent become strictly better oﬀ by adding the the
hyper-link (1 2 . . . (푘 + 1)), the unique link-wise stable cover is the complete
cover.
In the foregone discussion we used the synergy term 1
푛푖
[
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
], which
in fact counts for sum of the binary interactions in the sense 1
푛푖
[
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
] =∑
푗∈퐸∖푖[
1
푛푖
1
푛푗
]. Another formulation for the synergy term can be thought of the
interaction of all the agents in the hyper-link under consideration, namely can
be deﬁned as
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
. The payoﬀ of the individual 푖 under this alternative
synergy term is represented by 푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸[
1
푛푖
+
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
]
whenever the player is involved at least one paper-work with a co-author,
푢푖 = 1 whenever the player is working on a paper by himself only. In this
alternative Extended Co-authorship model, we show that for 푛 ≥ 4, the only
eﬃcient cover structure again consists of only one hyper-link with order 푛−1,
that is the hyper-link containing all of the individuals, 1, 2, ..., 푛. We also show
that, if a cover is link-wise stable under the above utility function for 푛 ≥ 4,
then it is also eﬃcient.
Proposition 2. In the extended co-author model with the utility function
18
푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸[
1
푛푖
+
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
] whenever the individual 푖 is not
isolated, 푢푖 = 1 otherwise, when 푛 ≥ 4 the only eﬃcient cover is the complete
cover. Moreover the unique link-wise stable cover is the complete cover.
Proof. To show the eﬃciency of the cover 퐶 = (1, 2, ..., 푛), ﬁrst let us compute
the utility of agent 푖 for 퐶. Since the structure is symmetric for all agents in
퐶, it suﬃces to compute 푢푖 for an arbitrary 푖. Pick 푖 ∈ 푁 . Then 1푛푖 = 1, and
for every 푗 ∈ 푁 ∖푖, 1
푛푗
= 1. So, 푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸[
1
푛푖
+
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
] = 1+
(푛−1)1+1 = 푛+1. Now, consider any other cover 퐶 ′ ∕= 퐶. For an individual
푖 ∈ 푁 , 푢푖(퐶 ′) to be maximum, 퐶 ′ should include hyper-links in which all
individuals except 푖, 푗 ∈ 퐸 ∖ 푖 is contained in only one hyper-link. Otherwise
1
푛푗
< 1, where 1 is the maximum value that 1
푛푗
can attain, so that the value of∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
and
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
becomes smaller. The other parameter that aﬀects the
value of 푢푖(퐶
′) is the number of hyper-links. Notice that, if all the individuals
other than 푖 are contained in only one hyper-link, then the possible cover
structures are: 퐶 = (12)(13)(14)...(1푛) (namely when the hyper-links of order
1 are formed), 퐶 = (123)(145)...(1(푛− 1)푛) (namely when the hyper-links of
order 2 are formed),..., 퐶 = (1234...푛−1
2
)(1(푛−1
2
+ 1)...푛)(namely when the
hyper-links of order (푛−1
2
) − 1 is formed), or hyper-links of diﬀerent order
are formed 퐶 = (12)(134...푘)...(1푘(푘 + 1)...(푛)). Consider the most general
case, let 퐶 = (1...푘)(1(푘 + 1)...푟)...(1(푟 + 1)...푛), where 2 ≤ 푘 ≤ (푟 − 2),
(푛 − 2) ≤ 푟 ≤ 푛. Assume that the number of hyper-links in 퐶 is 푚 and
the order of the hyper-links in 퐶 are 표푟푑(퐸1),...,표푟푑(퐸푚) respectively. Now
푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸[
1
푛푖
+
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
] = [ 1
푚
+표푟푑(퐸1)+
1
푚
]+[ 1
푚
+표푟푑(퐸2)+
1
푚
] + ... + [ 1
푚
+ 표푟푑(퐸푚) +
1
푚
]. Note that, as each 푗 ∈ 퐸 ∖ 푖 is contained in
only one hyper-link,
∑
푙∈1,...,푚(표푟푑(퐸푙)) = 푛 − 1. In each term in the above
sum, we have 2 1
푚
+ 표푟푑(퐸푙). Also note that we have 푚 terms, since there are
푚 hyper-links. Thus we have 푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸[
1
푛푖
+
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
] =
[ 1
푚
+ 표푟푑(퐸1) +
1
푚
] + [ 1
푚
+ 표푟푑(퐸2) +
1
푚
] + ...+ [ 1
푚
+ 표푟푑(퐸푚) +
1
푚
] = 푚.2. 1
푚
+∑
푙∈1,...,푚(표푟푑(퐸푙)) = 2+(푛−1) = 푛+1. That is, whenever each agent 푗 ∈ 퐸∖푖
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is contained in only one hyper-link in 퐶 ′ ∕= 퐶, where 퐶 = (1, 2, ..., 푛), we have
푢푖(퐶
′) = 푛+1 = 푢푖(퐶). Since 푗 ∈ 퐸∖푖 being included in more than one hyper-
link will decrease the value of 푢푖퐶
′, the maximum utility that individual 푖 can
achieve is 푛+ 1. Considering the same argument from the view of the agent
푗 ∕= 푖, we conclude that the payoﬀ of 푗 in the cover 퐶 ′ is strictly less that
푛 + 1, implying that the only eﬃcient cover is 퐶 = (12...푛). The maximum
payoﬀ that any agent can achieve in a cover structure 퐶 ′ ∕= 퐶 is 푛+ 1, while
the payoﬀs for remaining players 푗 ∕= 푖 is strictly less than 푛+ 1 we have, for
any cover 퐶 ′ ∕= (12...푛) and for any 푖 ∈ 푁 : 푢푖(퐶 ′) ≤ 푛 + 1 = 푢푖(퐶). Thus
the only link-wise stable cover is 퐶.
In the following, we use the alternative pay-oﬀ function 푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸
1
∣퐸∣ [
1
푛푖
+∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
] whenever the player is involved at least one paper-work
with a co-author, 푢푖 = 1 whenever the player is working on a paper by himself
only. In this case, the congestion eﬀect observed in the foregone discussion
disappears. For diﬀerent number of players 푛, the structure of link-wise stable
covers changes, however the eﬃcient cover structure is the cover consisting
the disjoint hyper-links of order 1 whenever the 푛 is even, and the cover con-
sisting the disjoint hyper-links of order 1 with an additional hyper-link of
order 0 whenever 푛 is odd. We ﬁrst establish the eﬃciency in the following
Proposition and then discuss the stability by means of examples.
Proposition 3. : In the extended co-author model with the utility function
푢푖 =
∑
퐸∈퐶:푖∈퐸
1
∣퐸∣ [
1
푛푖
+
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
+
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
] whenever the player is not iso-
lated, and 푢푖 = 1 otherwise, when 푛 ⩾ 4 the only eﬃcient cover is the cover
consisting of disjoint hyper-links of order 1.
Proof. : Consider a cover 퐶. For an individual 푖 ∈ 푁 , 푢푖(퐶) to be maximum,
퐶 should include hyper-links in which all individuals except 푖, 푗 ∈ 퐸 ∖ 푖 is
contained in only one hyper-link. Otherwise 1
푛푗
< 1, where 1 is the maximum
value that 1
푛푗
can attain, so that the value of
∑
푗∈퐸∖푖
1
푛푗
and
∏
푗∈퐸
1
푛푗
becomes
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smaller. Thus for eﬃciency we must have disjoint hyper-links. The other
parameter that aﬀects the value of 푢푖(퐶) is the number of hyper-links,and
in turn the number of players included in an hyper-link. Since we have the
coeﬃcient 1∣퐸∣ in front of each term of the summation, as ∣퐸∣ increases, the
synergy term decreases, so for eﬃciency we must have ∣퐸∣ = 2, to obtain the
maximum synergy.
Now we examine the stability in the following example:
Example 3. Consider the case where 푛 = 4: We will show 퐶 = {123, 14, 24, 34}
is link-wise stable. Notice that this cover includes two disjoint groups, namely
123 and 4, and all other possible hyper-links of order 1. 푢1(123, 14, 24, 34) =
1
3
[1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
8
] + 1
2
[1
2
+ 1
3
+ 1
6
] = 1 + 1
24
, and 푢1 = 푢2 = 푢3 by symmetry.
푢4(123, 14, 24, 34) =
1
2
[1
2
+ 1
3
+ 1
6
]+ 1
2
[1
2
+ 1
3
+ 1
6
]+ 1
2
[1
2
+ 1
3
+ 1
6
] = 1+ 1
2
. Deletion of
any hyper-link of order 1 will yield the same result by symmetry, so it suﬃces
to examine one, WLOG consider the deletion of the hyper-link (34), then
the pay-oﬀs of the third and the fourth players decrease: 푢3(123, 14, 24) =
1
3
[1
2
+ 1
2
+1+ 1
4
] = 2
3
+ 1
12
< 1+ 1
24
, and 푢4(123, 14, 24) =
1
2
[1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
4
] = 1+ 1
8
<
1 + 1
2
. Thus (123, 14, 24, 34) blocks (123, 14, 24). Now consider the deletion
of the hyper-link (123): 푢1(14, 24, 34) =
1
2
[1 + 1
3
+ 1
3
] = 1
2
+ 2
3
< 1 + 1
24
.
As 푢1(14, 24, 34) = 푢2(14, 24, 34) = 푢3(14, 24, 34), (123, 14, 24, 34) blocks
(14, 24, 34). Now consider the addition of a new hyper-link, (1234) and (234)
respectively. 푢4(1234) = 1 +
1
4
< 1 + 1
2
, so (123, 14, 24, 34) blocks (1234).
푢4(123, 234, 14) =
1
3
[1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
8
] + 1
2
[1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
4
] = 1 + 1
8
+ 1
24
< 1 + 1
2
, so
(123, 14, 24, 34) blocks (123, 234, 14). Since we examined all possible covers
퐶 ′ of the form 퐶 ′ = 퐶 + 퐸 with 퐸 ∕∈ 퐶 and 퐶 ′ = 퐶 − 퐸 with 퐸 ∈ 퐶, we
conclude that 퐶 = (123, 14, 24, 34) is link-wise stable.
Consider the case where 푛 = 5: We will show 퐶 = {125, 35, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34}
is link-wise stable. Notice that this cover includes two disjoint groups, namely
125 and 34, and all other possible hyper-links of order 1.
As in the above case, let us ﬁrst consider hyper-link deletion, and then
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hyper-link formation. By symmetry it suﬃces to consider the deletion of the
hyper-links (34), (35), (14), (125) respectively. For (34) :
푢3(125, 35, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13) =
1
2
[1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
9
].3 = 1 + 1
6
< 1 + 1
4
+ 1
32
= 1
2
[1
4
+ 1
3
+
1
12
].3 + 1
2
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
16
] = 푢3(퐶). Notice that the positions of the player 3 and 4
are symmetric, so that 퐶 blocks (125, 35, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13). For (35):
푢3(125, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34) =
1
2
[1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
9
].3 = 1+ 1
6
< 1+ 1
4
+ 1
32
= 푢3(퐶), and
푢5(125, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34) =
1
3
[1
2
+ 1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
18
]+ 1
2
[1
4
+ 1
2
+ 1
8
] < 1+ 1
34
= 푢3(퐶).
So we conclude that 퐶 blocks (125, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34). For (14):
푢1(125, 35, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34) =
1
3
[1
2
+ 1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
18
] + 1
2
[1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
8
] < 1 + 1
34
and
푢4(125, 35, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34) =
1
2
[1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
9
].2+ 1
2
[1
3
+ 1
4
+ 1
12
] = 1+ 1
9
< 1+ 1
4
+ 1
32
.
So we conclude that 퐶 blocks (125, 35, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34). For (125):
푢1(35, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34) =
1
2
[1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
8
].2 < 1 + 1
34
, and also note that the
roles of the players 1, 2, 5 are symmetric. So, we conclude that 퐶 blocks
(35, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34). Now let us consider possible hyper-link additions,
namely (12345), (1253), (1234), (134), (135) respectively. Note that all other
possible additions have the same impact by the symmetry of players, so we
will not write them explicitly. For (12345):
푢3(12345) = 1 +
1
5
< 1 + 1
4
+ 1
32
= 푢3(퐶). So, 퐶 blocks (12345). For (1253):
푢3(1254, 14, 24, 45, 43) = 1+
1
4
[1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
16
]+ 1
2
[1
2
+ 1
4
+ 1
8
] < 1 < 1+ 1
4
+ 1
32
.
So we conclude that 퐶 blocks (1254, 14, 24, 45, 43). For (1234):
푢3(1234, 125, 35, 45) =
1
4
[1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
16
]+ 1
2
[1
3
+ 1
2
+ 1
6
] = 1+ 1
64
< 1+ 1
4
+ 1
32
.
So, 퐶 blocks (1234, 125, 35, 45). For (134):
푢1(125, 134, 35, 24, 23, 45) =
1
3
[1
2
+ 1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
18
].2 < 1 < 1 + 1
34
. So, 퐶 blocks
(125, 134, 35, 24, 23, 45). For (135):
푢3(125, 135, 14, 24, 23, 45, 34) =
1
3
[1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
27
].2+ 1
2
[1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
9
].2 = 1+ 1
9
+ 1
34
<
1 + 1
4
+ 1
32
. So, 퐶 blocks (125, 135, 14, 24, 23, 45, 34). Since we considered all
possible cases, we conclude that 퐶 = {125, 35, 14, 24, 23, 45, 13, 34} is link-
wise stable.
Now let us extend the same structure to 푛 = 6. We will show that
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the cover 퐶 = (123, 45, 16, 26, 36, 46, 56, 14, 15, 24, 25, 34, 35, 45) is link-wise
stable. Notice that this cover includes two disjoint groups, namely 123 and
45, and all other possible hyper-links of order 1. Another possible structure
is (123, 456, 14, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36), which is not link-wise stable. Let
us ﬁrst show that the former cover is link-wise stable.
First consider the possible deletion of hyper-links, (14) and (45) respec-
tively. For (14):
푢1(123, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56) =
1
3
[1
3
+ 1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
48
]+ 1
2
[1
3
+ 1
5
+ 1
15
].2
=0.87 < 1 + 1
3.43
= 푢1(퐶). 푢4(123, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56) =
1
2
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
16
].2+ 1
2
[1
5
+ 1
4
+ 1
20
].2 < 1.19 = 푢4(퐶). So, 퐶 blocks (123, 15, 16, 24, 25
, 26 , 34, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56). For (45):
푢4(123, 14, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 56, 46) =
푢5(123, 14, 15, 16, 24, 25,26, 34, 35, 36, 56, 46) =
1
2
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
12
].3 + 1
2
[1
5
+ 1
4
+ 1
20
]
=1.125 < 1.19 = 푢4(퐶) = 푢5(퐶).
So, 퐶 blocks (123, 14, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 56, 46). Now consider possi-
ble additions of hyper-links, (456),(234), (1234), (12345), (123456). For (456):
푢4(123, 456, 14, 15, 16, 2425, 26, 34, 35, 36) =
1
3
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
64
] + 1
2
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
16
].3
=1.098 < 1.19. Thus, 퐶 blocks (123, 456, 14, 15, 16, 2425, 26, 34, 35, 36). For
(234):
푢4(123, 234, 14, 15, 16, 25, 26, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56) =
1
3
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
64
] + 1
2
[1
2
+1
2
+
1
16
] + 1
2
[1
4
+ 1
5
+ 1
20
] =0.79 < 1.19 = 푢4(퐶).
So, 퐶 blocks
(123, 234, 14, 15, 16, 25, 26, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56). For (1234):
푢4(1234, 15, 16, 25, 26, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56) =
1
4
[1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
3
+ 1
81
]+ 1
2
[1
3
+ 1
5
+ 1
15
] < 1.
So, 퐶 blocks (1234, 15, 16, 25, 26, 35,36, 45, 46, 56). For (12345):
푢5(12345, 16, 26, 36, 46, 56) =
1
5
[1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1
32
]+ 1
2
[1
2
+ 1
5
+ 1
10
] = 0.906 < 1.
So, 퐶 blocks (12345, 16, 26, 36, 46, 56). For (123456):
푢4(123456) = 1 +
1
6
= 1.16 < 1.19 = 푢4(퐶). So, 퐶 blocks (123456).
Thus, we conclude that 퐶 is link-wise stable. Now let us examine the cover
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퐶 = (123, 456, 14, 15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 34, 35, 36).
푢1(퐶) =
1
3
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
64
]+ 1
2
[1
4
+ 1
4
+ 1
16
].3 = 1.098 < 1.166 = 푢1(123456). Thus,
the cover (123456) blocks 퐶. One may suspect that, whether this structure
is link-wise stable for all 푛, the following examples shows this is not the case:
For 푛 = 7:
Let 퐶 = (123, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 26, 27,34, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 47, 56, 57, 67).
푢1(퐶) =
1
3
[1
5
+ 1
5
+ 1
5
+ 1
125
] + 1
2
[1
5
+ 1
6
+ 1
30
].4 = 1.002 < 1.14 = 푢1(1234567).
Thus 퐶 is not link-wise stable.
퐶 = (123, 456, 17, 27, 37, 47, 57, 67, 14, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36), whose struc-
ture is same with 퐶 ′ = (123, 456, 14, 15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 34, 35, 36), is link-wise
stable whereas 퐶 ′ is not. As we have seen from this examples above, the
structure of the link-wise stable cover changes for each 푛.
This example motivated us to study link-wise stability further to capture
the relations between networks and covers. Studying on link-wise stability
under the Myerson value for for diﬀerent values of 푛, motivated us to use the
”cycles” in order to prove the existence of link-wise stable covers under the
Myerson-value. We use the idea that Jackson (2002)used to prove existence
of pairwise stability under Myerson value in networks, to show the existence
of the link-wise stable covers under Myerson value.
Theorem 1. Let a value function 푣 ∈ 푉 , and an allocation rule 푌 be given.
If there is some function 푓 : 풞푁 → ℝ such that [퐶 ′푏푒푎푡푠퐶]⇔ [푓(퐶 ′) > 푓(퐶)]
then there is no cycle.
Proof. Assume that there exists a function 푓 : 풞푁 → ℝ such that [퐶 ′ beats
퐶] ⇔ [푓(퐶 ′) > 푓(퐶)]. Suppose that there there is a cycle. Let 퐶 be an ele-
ment of this cycle, then there is a cover 퐶 ′ beating 퐶. By deﬁnition a cycle is a
closed improving path, that is we have the improving path 퐶,퐶 ′, . . . , 퐶 ′′, 퐶.
Now by assumption 푓(퐶 ′) > 푓(퐶), 푓(퐶) > 푓(퐶 ′′) and by the transitivity
of the relation >, 푓(퐶 ′′) > 푓(퐶 ′). Again using the transitivity, we obtain
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푓(퐶 ′) > 푓(퐶 ′) which is a contraction. Thus under our assumption, there is
no cycle.
In the construction of the function f and in the above proof we do not use
the cover structure explicitly. Rather we view the concept of a cover beating
another one as a transitive relation. Interpreting the function 푓 as the tool
giving some degree (or value) to each cover, the assumption in the theorem
implies that if a cover 퐶 ′ beats 퐶, then the degree of 퐶 ′ should be larger
than the degree of 퐶. Also note that, the degree function f does not depend
explicitly on 푣 and 푌 . Now we show the existence of link-wise stability under
the Myerson value as a corollary of this theorem. We ﬁrst prove a lemma
which will be used in the corollary. Also, we will use 푣 and 푌 implicitly to
deﬁne the degree function 푓 in the following corollary. Before, we will prove
a lemma that will be used in the proof of the corollary.
Lemma 1. Given any value function 푣 ∈ 푉 and any allocation rule 푌 , either
there exists cycles of covers or there exists a link-wise stable cover.
Proof.
Claim. A cover 퐶 is link-wise stable iﬀ there is no improving path 퐶1, 퐶2, . . . , 퐶푘
such that ∃ some 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푘} : 퐶푖 = 퐶 for 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푘 − 1}.
Assume that the cover 퐶 is link-wise stable and there is an improving path
퐶1, 퐶2, . . . , 퐶푘 such that ∃ some 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푘} : 퐶푖 = 퐶. But then 퐶푖+1
blocks 퐶, contradicting with 퐶 being link-wise stable. Conversely assume that
there is no improving path 퐶1, 퐶2, . . . , 퐶푘 such that ∃ some 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푘} :
퐶푖 = 퐶 for 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푘 − 1}, but 퐶 is not link-wise stale. But then there
exists some cover 퐶 ′ such that 퐶 ′ and 퐶 are adjacent and 퐶 ′ blocks 퐶. So
we have the improving path 퐶,퐶 ′ contradicting with assumption.
Let 퐶 be any cover. By our claim, either it is link-wise stable, or there is
an improving path ∃ some 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푘} : 퐶푖 = 퐶 for 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푘 − 1}.
In the former case the statement is automatically shown. In the latter case,
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either the improving path stops in some cover 퐶 ′ or the path traces all the
possible covers. If it stops in some cover 퐶 ′ then this cover is link-wise stable.
If it traces all the possible covers and still does not stop at some cover, then
this means that there is a cycle.
Corollary 1. Given any value function 푣 ∈ 푉 , and Myerson value 푌 푀푉 ,
there exists a link-wise stable cover relative to 푣 and 푌 푀푉 .
Proof. Assume that 퐶 ′ beats 퐶. Then either 퐶 ′ = 퐶 + 퐸 and ∀푖 ∈ 퐸 :
푌 푀푉푖 (퐸 + 퐶) ≥ 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶) and ∃푗 ∈ 퐸 : 푌 푀푉푖 (퐸 + 퐶) > 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶), or
퐶 ′ = 퐶 − 퐸 and ∃푖 ∈ 퐸 : 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶 − 퐸) > 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶). Deﬁne 푓(퐶) =∑
푇⊆푁 푣(퐶∣푇 )[ (∣푇 ∣−1)!(푛−∣푇 ∣!)푛! By direct calculation we have: 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶 + 퐸) −
푌 푀푉푖 (퐶) = 푓(퐶 + 퐸) − 푓(퐶). Now if 퐶 ′ = 퐶 + 퐸 and 퐶 ′ beats 퐶, then by
the above equality we have 푓(퐶 + 퐸) > 푓(퐶). If 퐶 ′ = 퐶 − 퐸 and 퐶 ′ beats
퐶, then replacing 퐶 + 퐸 by 퐶 and 퐶 by 퐶 − 퐸 in the above equality, we
get 푓(퐶 −퐸) > 푓(퐶) again. Thus by the Theorem 1, there is no cycles with
respect to Myerson value. By the 1, we then have a link-wise stable cover.
Thus we established the existence of link-wise stable covers with respect
to the Myerson value. However, there are also some allocations with respect
to which there is no link-wise stable cover. The following example captures
this.
Example 4. Let 푛 = 3, and the value function be given as follows: 푣(1, 2, 3) =
0, 푣(12, 3) = 2, 푣(13, 2) = 3, 푣(1, 23) = 2, 푣(12, 23) = 1, 푣(12, 13) = 2,
푣(13, 23) = 4, 푣(12, 23, 31) = 3, 푣(123) = 6 Let the value of each cover
be allocated as follows: 푣(1, 2, 3) = (0, 0, 0), 푣(12, 3) = (1, 1, 0), 푣(13, 2) =
(3, 2,−2), 푣(1, 23) = (2, 1,−1), 푣(12, 23) = (2, 0,−1), 푣(12, 13) = (2,−1, 1),
푣(13, 23) = (3, 1, 0),푣(12, 23, 31) = (1, 0, 2), 푣(123) = (4, 3,−1). Now there is
no link-wise stable cover as we have the following cycle: (1, 2, 3)→ (12, 3)→
(12, 13) → (12, 23, 31) → (12, 23) → (1, 23) → (13, 23) → (13, 2) → (123) →
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(1, 2, 3).
3.2 Core Stability and Core
In link-wise stability, deviations of coalitions are assumed to consist of adding
or severing a hyper-link in one step. We extend this deviation assumption
so that they may include addition and/or deletion of several hyper-links in
one step. We deﬁne this idea in two diﬀerent ways; in the ﬁrst one we allow
player in the deviating coalition, to form relations (hyper-links) only among
themselves, and players outside the deviating coalition are not allowed to
form relations (hyper-links of order 0), whereas in the second one, we allow
players in the deviating coalition to severe the relations in the former cover
structure, to form new relations among themselves, but the players outside
the deviating coalition are assumed to preserve their relations as in the for-
mer cover structure. We investigate the core and the core stability notions
respectively, and ﬁnd an environment in which these two concepts coincide.
Given a value function 푣, for an eﬃcient cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , core relative to
푣 may be empty. In the following example, we show that for 푁 = 3 players,
core for an eﬃcient cover may be empty.
Example 5. Let 푛 = 3 and the value function be given by: 푣(1, 2, 3) =
0, 푣(12, 3) = 푣(13, 2) = 푣(23, 1) = 6, 푣(12, 23) = 푣(13, 23) = 푣(12, 13) =
3, 푣(12, 13, 23) = 2 and 푣(123) = 2. Note that the eﬃcient covers are :
(12, 3), (13, 2), (23, 1).
Claim. Given one of the eﬃcient covers, the core relative to 푣 is empty.
Since the structure is symmetric, without loss of generality, consider the
cover (12, 3). Assume that 푦 = (푦1, 푦2, 푦3) is an element of the core. Then we
have:
푦1 + 푦2 + 푦3 ≤ 푣(12, 3) = 6 푦1 + 푦2 ≥ 6 푦1 + 푦3 ≥ 6 푦2 + 푦3 ≥ 6
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where the last three inequalities imply that 푦1 + 푦2 + 푦3 ≥ 9 which is a
contradiction. Hence the core is empty.
Given a value function 푣, for an eﬃcient cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 , we will prove that
the core is nonempty if the value function is convex. We state this result in
the following theorem.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the marginal contribution vector 휑휎(푣) as follows.
Deﬁnition 27. Let 휎 = (푖1, . . . , 푖푛) ∈ 푆푛 be a permutation of the player set
푁 . Deﬁne 휃1 = 푣ˆ(퐶
푖1) − 푣ˆ(1, 2, . . . , 푛) and for any 푘 ≥ 2: 휃2 = 푣ˆ(퐶푖1,푖2) −
푣ˆ(퐶푖1). The vector 휃 = (휃1, 휃2, . . . , 휃푛) ∈ ℝ is called the marginal contribution
vector and is denoted by 휑휎(푣).
Theorem 2. Let 푣 : 풞푁 → ℝ be a convex value function. Let 퐶 be an eﬃcient
cover relative to 푣. For any permutation 휎 ∈ 푆푛, the associated marginal
contribution vector 휑휎(푣) belongs to the core for 퐶 relative to (푁, 푣).
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that 휎 = (1, . . . , 푛) and 퐶 is an
eﬃcient cover. Now∑
푖∈푁(휑휎(푣))푖 =
∑
푖=1푛(푣ˆ(퐶
1,...,푖)− 푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푖−1))
= (푣ˆ(퐶1)− 푣ˆ(1, . . . , 푛)) + . . .+ (푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푛)− 푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푛−1))
= 푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푛)− 푣ˆ(1, . . . , 푛) = 푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푛) = 푣(퐶) as 퐶 is eﬃcient.
Take any coalition 푆 ⊂ 푁 , say 푆 = {푖1, . . . , 푖푠} with 푖1 ≤ 푖2 ≤ . . . ≤ 푖푠.
For any 푡 ∈ {2, . . . , 푠} : {푖1, . . . , 푖푡−1} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , 푖푡−1}. Now by the convex-
ity of the value function 푣 we have: For any 푡 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푠} : 푣ˆ(퐶푖1,...,푖푡) −
푣ˆ(퐶푖1,...,푖푡−1) ≤ 푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푖푡)−푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푖푡−1), and for 푡 = 1 : 푣ˆ(퐶푖1)−푣ˆ({1, . . . , 푛}) ≤
푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푖1) − 푣ˆ(퐶1,...,푖1−1). Summing these inequalities over 푡, 푣ˆ(퐶푖1,...,푖푠) −
푣(1, 2, . . . , 푛) ≤∑푖푡∈푆(휑휎(푣))푖푡 = ∑푖∈푆(휑휎(푣))푖
Hence given an eﬃcient cover, the marginal contribution vector 휑휎(푣)
belongs to the core.
We now deﬁne the Player Based Flexible Cover allocation rule, which is
deﬁned by Jackson (2003)in network setting, as follows.
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Given a value function 푣 and a cover 퐶, the allocation of the 푖− 푡ℎ agent
is deﬁned by: 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푖 (퐶) =
푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푖}(푣ˆ(퐶
푆∪{푖})− 푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!
푛!
We now prove that, given any convex value function 푣 ∈ 푉 푐, and an eﬃ-
cient cover 퐶, the allocation obtained by using Player Based Flexible Cover,
(PBFC), allocation rule always belongs to the core. In other words, given
any 푣 ∈ 푉 푐, and any eﬃcient cover 퐶, the core for 퐶 relative to (푁, 푣) is
nonempty.
Corollary 2. Let 푣 ∈ 푉 푐 be a convex value function, and 퐶 be an eﬃcient
cover relative to 푣. Now the value obtained by Player Based Flexible Cover
allocation rule belongs to the core.
Proof. Fix an eﬃcient cover 퐶.
Claim. Core relative to 푣 is a convex set.
Assume 푦1 and 푦2 belong to the core. Now, 휆
∑
푖∈푁 푦
1
푖 +(1−휆)
∑
푖∈푁 푦
2
푖 ≤
휆푣(퐶) + (1 − 휆)푣(퐶) = 푣(퐶) Let 푆 ⊂ 푁 , 휆∑푖∈푆 푦1푖 + (1 − 휆)∑푖∈푆 푦2푖 ≥
휆푣ˆ(퐶푆) + (1 − 휆)푣ˆ(퐶푆) = 푣ˆ(퐶푆) Thus core is a convex set. Since core is a
convex set, and 휑휎(푣) is a member of the core, the convex combinations of
it also belong to the core. Noting that 푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
= 1, we have: 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶(퐶) =
푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
휎∈푆푛 휑휎(푣)
1
푛!
belong to the core.
Corollary 3. The player based ﬂexible cover allocation rule 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶 is core
consistent relative to 푉 푐.
Remark 1. For convex TU-games, we know that the allocation induced by
the Shapley value is a member of the core. However, for covers the allocation
induced by Myerson value, which is the counterpart of the allocation induced
by Shapley value, is not necessarily a member of the core for an eﬃcient cover
퐶.
The following example points out this situation.
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Example 6. Let 푛 = 3, and the value function as follows: 푣(1, 2, 3) = 0,
푣(12, 3) = 푣(13, 2) = 푣(1, 23) = −6, 푣(12, 13) = 푣(12, 23) = 푣(13, 23) = 0,
푣(12, 23, 13) = −12, 푣(123) = −3.
Claim. 푣 deﬁned as above is a convex value funciton.
Recall the convexity deﬁnition: A value function 푣 ∈ 푉 is said to be convex
if ∀푖 ∈ 푁, ∀푆, 푇 ∈ 2푁∖{푖} : 푆 ⊂ 푇 ⇒ 푣ˆ(퐶푆∪푖)− 푣ˆ(퐶푆) ≤ 푣ˆ(퐶푇∪푖)− 푣ˆ(퐶푇 ).
Now notice that, for any 푅 ⊆ 푁 we have 푣ˆ(퐶푅) = 0 by the deﬁnition of 푣.
Thus convexity is satisﬁed trivially. The Myerson value allocates the values
to individuals as follows:
푣(1, 2, 3) = (0, 0, 0), 푣(12, 3) = (−3,−3, 0), 푣(13, 2) = (−3, 0,−3), 푣(1, 23) =
(0,−3,−3), 푣(12, 13) = (−2, 1, 1), 푣(12, 23) = (1,−2, 1), 푣(13, 23) = (1, 1,−2),
푣(12, 23, 13) = (−4,−4,−4), 푣(123) = (−1,−1,−1).
Now, the cover (12, 23) is eﬃcient, however the allocation (1,−2, 1) is not
an element of the core for (12, 23), since
∑
푖∈{2} 푦푖 = 푦2 = −2 < 0 = 푣ˆ(퐶{2}).
Remark 2. One of the other well known property of Shapley value in TU
games is individually rationality at any super additive TU game v. The
allocation induced by Myerson value for covers, however fails to satisfy this
property.
We point out this situation by further investigating the above example 6
in more detail.
In the example above 6, the value function is super additive trivially. The
Myerson value 푌 푀푉 is IR at ((1, 2, 3), 푣) that is individually rational at only
the disconnected cover. We show in the following proposition that player
based ﬂexible cover allocation rule 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶 is individually rational at (풞푒, 푣)
for any value function.
Proposition 4. The player based ﬂexible cover allocation rule 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶 is in-
dividually rational at (풞푒, 푉 ).
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Proof. Take any value function 푣 ∈ 푉 . Let 푖 ∈ 푁 . Now for any 푆 ⊂
푁 ∈ {푖} we have 푣ˆ(퐶푆∪{푖}) − 푣ˆ(퐶푆) ≥ 0, if not 푣ˆ(퐶푆∪{푖}) < 푣ˆ(퐶푆) which
can not happen since 푆 ∪ {푖} can obtain the value at least guaranteed by
푆 by making the same hyper-links and leaving {푖} isolated. Also note that
푣ˆ(퐶{푖}) = 0, so we have 푣ˆ(퐶{푖}) ≤ 푣ˆ(퐶푆∪{푖}) − 푣ˆ(퐶푆). Now multiplying
both sides by ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!)
푛!
and summing both sides over 푆 ⊆ 푁 ∖ {푖} we
get
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푖} 푣ˆ(퐶
{푖}) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!)
푛!
≤∑푆⊂푁∖{푖}(푣ˆ(퐶푆∪{푖})−푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!)푛! .
Now multiplying both sides by 푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
, we get 푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푖} 푣ˆ(퐶
{푖}) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!)
푛!
≤
푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푖}(푣ˆ(퐶
푆∪{푖}) − 푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!)
푛!
. Note that 푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
= 1 when-
ever 퐶 ∈ 풞푒 and note also that ∑푆⊂푁∖{푖} ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!)푛! = 1. Then for any
eﬃcient cover 퐶 and any super additive value function 푣, we have 푣ˆ(퐶{푖}) ≤
푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푖 (퐶, 푣). Thus the player based ﬂexible allocation rule is individually
rational at (풞푒, 푉 ).
We will show in the next section that the Myerson value is IR at (풞¯, 푉 )
for some special class of covers 풞¯ to be deﬁned in the next section.
We now investigate the relationship between the allocations induced by
core-stable covers and the allocations in core, and see that under the PBFC
allocation rule, in fact the two allocations coincide. That is, given any convex
value function 푣, and an eﬃcient cover 퐶 with respect to 푣, the allocation
obtained by applying the PBFC allocation rule belong to the core. In the
following theorem, we will show that any eﬃcient cover 퐶 with respect to 푣
is core stable relative to 푣 and the PBFC allocation rule, moreover any core
stable cover relative to 푣 and the PBFC allocation rule is eﬃcient.
Theorem 3. Given any value function 푣 ∈ 푉 , a cover 퐶 is eﬃcient relative
to 푣 iﬀ 퐶 is core stable relative to 푣 and player based ﬂexible cover allocation
rule 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶.
Proof. Assume that C is eﬃcient, and not core stable relative to 푣 and 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶 .
Then there exists a coalition 푇 ⊆ 푁 such that ∃퐶 ′ ∈ 풞푁 obtainable from 퐶
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via 푇 and ∀푖 ∈ 푇 : 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푖 (퐶 ′) ≥ 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푖 (퐶) and ∃푗 ∈ 푇 : 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푗 (퐶 ′) >
푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푗 (퐶). That is there exists some 푗 ∈ 푇 : 푣(퐶
′)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푗}(푣ˆ(퐶
푆∪{푗}) −
푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!
푛!
> 푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푗}(푣ˆ(퐶
푆∪{푗}) − 푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!
푛!
. Note
that the part 1
퐶푁
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푗}(푣ˆ(퐶
푆∪{푗}) − 푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!
푛!
is same in both
sides so we get the inequality: 푣(퐶 ′) > 푣(퐶) which contradicts with the eﬃ-
ciency of 퐶. Conversely, assume that 퐶 is core stable with respect to 푣 and
푌 푃퐵퐹퐶 but not eﬃcient relative to 푣. Take 푇 = 푁 , and any eﬃcient cover
퐶 ′. Then since 푣(퐶 ′) > 푣(퐶), we have ∀푖 ∈ 푁 : 푣(퐶′)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푖}(푣ˆ(퐶
푆∪{푖}) −
푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!
푛!
> 푣(퐶)
푣ˆ(퐶푁 )
∑
푆⊂푁∖{푖}(푣ˆ(퐶
푆∪{푖}) − 푣ˆ(퐶푆)) ∣푆∣!(푛−∣푆∣−1)!
푛!
, equiva-
lently ∀푖 ∈ 푁 : 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푖 (퐶 ′) > 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶푖 (퐶). Implying that 푁 can improve upon
퐶 via 퐶 ′, contradicting with 퐶 being core stable.
1
Corollary 4. Given any convex value function 푣 ∈ 푉 푐, if a cover 퐶 is core
stable relative to 푣 and 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶, then 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶(퐶) belongs to the core for 퐶
relative to (푁, 푣).
3.3 Hyper-link Formation Game
We investigated some stability notions in cover theory, namely link-wise sta-
bility and core stability. Then we deﬁned core for cover structures, and in-
vestigated its properties and pointed out the relationship between core and
core stability. Besides taking a cover structure as given and then working
with it, another way to investigate the structure is via strategic form games,
which allows us to consider the endogenous formation of covers. We deﬁne
the hyper-link formation game in which the player set is nonempty ﬁnite set
of agents, strategy spaces consists of the independently announced links to
be formed, and the utility function is taken as an allocation rule.
1The corresponding result for networks was examined by Kapan T.
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We deﬁne these concepts more precisely as follows. Given a value function
푣 : 풞푁 → ℝ, and an allocation rule 푌 : 풞푁 × 푉 → ℝ푛, we deﬁne the normal
form game Γ(푣, 푌 ) = (푁 , 푆1, . . . , 푆푛, 푢
푣,푌 ) where 푁 denotes the nonempty
ﬁnite set of players, 푆푖 denote the strategy space of agent 푖, and 푢
푣,푌 denotes
the utility function. For all 푖 ∈ 푁 , 휉푖 = {퐸 ∈ 2푁 ∖ {∅} : 푖 ∈ 퐸} is the
set of all possible hyper-links that agent 푖 can form. The strategy set of
each agent is then deﬁned by 푆푖 = 2
휉푖 . That is each agent’s strategy is a
list of hyper-links that he is willing to form. Denote the strategy space by
푆 =
∏
푖∈푁 푆푖. Given a hyper-link formation game Γ(푣, 푌 ), and a strategy
proﬁle 푠 ∈ 푆, the cover 퐶 induced by 푠 is deﬁned by 퐶(푠) = {퐸 ∈ 2푁 ∖ {∅}
: ∀푖 ∈ 퐸 : 퐸 ∈ 푠푖} ∖ {퐸 ′ ∈ 2푁 ∖ {∅} : ∀푖 ∈ 퐸 ′ : 퐸 ′ ∈ 푠푖 with 퐸 ′ ⊆ 퐸}. The
utility function 푢푣,푌 : 푆 → ℝ푛 is deﬁned by 푢푣,푌푖 (푠) = 푌푖(푣, 퐶(푠)) where 퐶(푠)
is the cover induced by the strategy proﬁle 푠.
We will write 푢푖 for 푢
푣,푌
푖 from this point on.
Given the strategic form game Γ(푣, 푌 ), a strategy of an agent 푖 ∈ 푁 is the
list of hyper-links that agent 푖 is willing to form. Each agent announces his
list, that is hyper-links he is willing to form, and then a hyper-link is formed
if it is included in the list of each member of that hyper-link. Note that a
hyper-link is formed under the mutual consent of the players involved in that
hyper-link. It is worth noting that, if two hyper-links 퐸 and 퐸 ′ satisfy the
requirement of being formed and if 퐸 ⊆ 퐸 ′, then the hyper-link 퐸 ′ is formed
but not 퐸.
We now deﬁne the Nash Equilibrium and Strong Nash Equilibrium for
hyper-link formation game and Nash stability and Strong Nash stability for
covers induced by these solution concepts as follows.
Deﬁnition 28. A strategy proﬁle 푠 ∈ 푆 is said to be a Nash Equilibrium of
the game Γ(푣, 푌 ) if for any 푖 ∈ 푁 and 푠′푖 ∈ 푆푖 : 푢푖(푠) > 푢푖(푠′푖, 푠−푖). A cover
퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is called Nash stable relative to (푣, 푌 ) if there exists 푠 ∈ 푆 such that
푠 is a Nash Equilibrium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 ) and 퐶 = 퐶(푠), that is 퐶 is the
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cover induced by the strategy proﬁle 푠.
We will denote the set of all Nash stable covers by 풞푁푆.
In the previous section we stated that the Myerson value is IR at (풞¯, 푉 )
for some special class of covers 풞¯ to be deﬁned. We now provide this result.
Proposition 5. The Myerson value 푌 푀푉 is individually rational at (풞푁푆, 푉 ).
Proof. Let 푣 ∈ 푉 be any value function, and 퐶 ∈ 풞푁푆 be any Nash stable
cover. Considering the hyper-link formation game, there is a Nash equilibrium
of the game Γ(푣, 푌 푀푉 ) from which 퐶 is induced. Suppose that there is some
푖 ∈ 푁 such that 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶, 푣) < 푣ˆ(퐶{푖}). Note that 푣ˆ(퐶{푖}) = 0 since the cover
that {푖} can form individually is (1, 2, . . . , 푛). This means that 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶, 푣) <
0, but then 푖 can guarantee getting 0 by changing his strategy to 푠′푖 = {푖},
that is by changing his strategy in such a way that he becomes isolated. But
then 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶(푠
′
푖, 푠푁∖{푖}), 푣) = 0 > 푌
푀푉
푖 (퐶(푠), 푣), contradicting with 푠 being a
Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 푀푉 ). Thus 푌 푀푉푖 (퐶, 푣) ≥ 푣ˆ(퐶{푖}) for any
Nash stable cover 퐶 and any value function 푣, implying that Myerson value
is individually rational at (풞푁푆, 푉 ).
Remark 3. Given a value function 푣 : 풞푁 → ℝ, for a Nash stable cover
퐶 ∈ 풞푁푆, the set {푌 (퐶)}, where 푌 is any allocation rule 푌 : 풞푁 × 푉 → ℝ푛,
contains the core for 퐶 relative to (푁, 푣) whenever 퐶 is eﬃcient.
Deﬁnition 29. A strategy proﬁle 푠 ∈ 푆 is said to be a Strong Nash Equilib-
rium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 ) if there exist no coalition 푇 ⊆ 푁 such that there
exists 푠′푇 ∈ 푆푇 =
∏
푖∈푇 푠푖 with ∀푖 ∈ 푇 : 푢푖(푠′푇 , 푠푁∖푇 ) ≥ 푢푖(푠) and ∃푗 ∈ 푇 :
푢푖(푠
′
푇 , 푠푁∖푇 ) > 푢푖(푠). A cover 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 is called Strong Nash stable relative to
(푣, 푌 ) if there exists 푠 ∈ 푆 such that 푠 is a Strong Nash Equilibrium of the
game Γ(푣, 푌 ) and 퐶 = 퐶(푠), that is 퐶 is the cover induced by the strategy
proﬁle 푠.
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The resemblance between strong Nash stability and the core stability is
worth noting. We state the relationship between the two in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. Given a hyper-link formation game Γ(푣, 푌 ), if a strategy
proﬁle 푠 ∈ 푆 is a Strong Nash Equilibrium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 ), then the
cover induced by the strategy proﬁle 푠, namely 퐶(푠) is core-stable relative to
(푣, 푌 ).
Proof. Assume that 푠 is a strong Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 ), and
let 퐶 be the cover induced by the strategy proﬁle 푠, that is 퐶 = 퐶(푠). Suppose
that 퐶 is not core stable. Then there is some 푇 ⊂ 푁 that can improve upon
퐶 via some 퐶 ′. That is, there is some 푇 ⊂ 푁 such that 퐶 ′ is obtainable
from 퐶 and for every 푖 ∈ 푇 : 푌푖(퐶 ′) ≥ 푌푖(퐶) and there is some 푗 ∈ 푇 :
푌푗(퐶
′) > 푌푗(퐶). Let 푠′ be the strategy proﬁle inducing the cover 퐶 ′. By
deﬁnition of obtainability of 퐶 ′ from 퐶, 푠′ is of the form 푠′ = (푠′푇 , 푠−푇 ). For if
the agents outside the 푇 also change their strategy proﬁles, then the hyper-
links having no agents in 푇 may also change which is not allowed. So we have:
there exists some 푇 ⊂ 푁 : for all 푖 ∈ 푇 : 푌푖(퐶(푠′푇 , 푠−푇 )) ≥ 푌푖(퐶(푠)) and there
is some agent 푗 ∈ 푇 : 푌푗(퐶(푠′푇 , 푠−푇 )) > 푌푗(퐶(푠)), that is 푢푖(푠′푇 , 푠−푇 ) ≥ 푢푖(푠)
for all 푖 ∈ 푇 and 푢푗(푠′푇 , 푠−푇 ) > 푢푗(푠) for some 푗 ∈ 푇 , which is contradiction
with 푠 being a strong Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 ). Thus 퐶(푠) is
core stable relative to (푣, 푌 ).
As a result of this proposition, we state the relationship between Strong
Nash stability and the core in the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Given a convex value function 푣 ∈ 푉 푐, and a hyper-link forma-
tion game Γ(푣, 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶), if a strategy proﬁle 푠 ∈ 푆 is a Strong Nash Equilib-
rium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶), and if the cover induced by the strategy proﬁle
푠 is 퐶(푠), then 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶(퐶) belongs to the core relative to (푁, 푣).
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Proof. Let 푠 be a strong Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(푣, 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶), and let
퐶 be the cover induced by 푠. By the above proposition 6, 퐶 is core stable
relative to 푣 and 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶 . By the theorem Theorem 3, 퐶 is eﬃcient relative to
푣. By the corollary 2, since 푣 is convex and 퐶 is eﬃcient, 푌 푃퐵퐹퐶(퐶) belongs
to the core for 퐶 relative to (푁, 푣).
36
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed the Extended Co-author Model which we deﬁned
using the cover structure, introduced by Koray, as an extension of the Co-
author Model proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky, (1996). We showed the
eﬃcient and the stable cover structures under four diﬀerent productivity, or
utility, functions we proposed. The results we found diﬀer from those found by
Jackson and Wolinsky. We showed the existence of link-wise stable covers un-
der the Myerson value. We examined the far-sighted stability notions, namely
the core-stability and the core of the cover structure in addition to link-wise
stability, which is a myopic stability notion. We showed the non-emptiness
of the core similar to that of in the cooperative game theory. Diﬀerent from
cooperative game theory, we showed that the Myerson value which is the
counterpart of the Shapley value in the cooperative game theory, is not nec-
essarily an element of the core. We showed the equivalence of eﬃciency of a
cover with respect to any value function and the core stability of a cover with
respect to any value function under the player based ﬂexible cover allocation
rule. We showed the relationship between the core-stability and core under
the player based ﬂexible cover allocation rule and any convex value function.
Lastly we deﬁned the strategic form game, namely the hyper-link formation
game for covers. We showed that the cover induced by Strong Nash Equilib-
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rium of the hyper-link formation game for any convex value function and the
player based ﬂexible cover allocation rule belongs to the core of 퐶 ∈ 풞푁 and
the convex value function.
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